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SECURITIES FRAUD EMBEDDED IN THE MARKET 
STRUCTURE CRISIS: HIGH-FREQUENCY 
TRADERS AS PRIMARY VIOLATORS 
STANISLAV DOLGOPOLOV? 
ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes approaches to attaching liability for 
securities fraud to high-frequency traders as primary violators in 
connection with the current market structure crisis. One of the 
manifestations of this crisis pertains to inadequate disclosure of 
advanced functionalities offered by trading venues, as exemplified 
by the order type controversy. The Article’s analysis is applied to 
secret arrangements between trading venues and preferred trad-
ers, glitches and gaming, and the reach of the doctrine of market 
manipulation, and several relevant issues are also viewed from 
the standpoint of the integrity of the trading process. The Article 
concludes by arguing for a balanced approach to catching certain 
problematic practices of high-frequency traders as securities fraud. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of high-frequency trading (“HFT”), one of 
the pivotal ingredients of the current market structure crisis, has 
captivated the public eye, while becoming a key regulatory and legal 
issue.1 Given the importance of this phenomenon, high-frequency 
traders (“HFTs”) need to be evaluated as potential targets in 
enforcement actions or private lawsuits for engaging in securi-
ties fraud, with the federal antifraud prohibition being embodied 
by Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act) and the corresponding Rule 10b-5 promulgated by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).2 Surpris-
ingly, HFTs have been largely absent from the ranks of parties 
held liable for securities fraud, despite being referenced under such 
monikers as “Trading Firm A” and “Trading Firm B” in promi-
nent enforcement actions against other parties.3 Moreover, while 
a blockbuster class action lawsuit backed away from suing HFTs 
for securities fraud,4 perhaps anticipating serious difficulties with 
                                                                                                            
1 For an extensive discussion of HFT in connection with the current market 
structure crisis and related regulatory and legal developments, see HAIM BODEK 
& STANISLAV DOLGOPOLOV, THE MARKET STRUCTURE CRISIS: ELECTRONIC 
STOCK MARKETS, HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING, AND DARK POOLS (2015). 
2 Rule 10b-5, which is the primary weapon of private litigants in contrast 
to other antifraud provisions of the federal securities statutes and corre-
sponding rules, has been famously described as “a judicial oak which has 
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). In addition to this rule, the regulators 
may resort to different antifraud provisions for a specific reason: “[T]he SEC 
can reach most of the conduct covered by Rule 10b-5 under section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act [of 1933] without proving scienter.” Steve Thel, Taking 
Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 39 (2014). 
3 This example is taken from the recent enforcement action against Direct 
Edge’s two securities exchanges in connection with their order type-related 
practices. EDGA Exch. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,032 (Jan. 12, 2015) 
(settled proceeding), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74032.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QD2L-CXBL]. While this action was largely based on the 
failure to follow proper rulemaking procedures rather than securities fraud, 
the crux of the matter was in insufficient disclosure, and, as described in the 
settlement, these two unnamed HFT firms were actively involved in design-
ing specific order types that essentially amounted to secret arrangements 
with these exchanges. Id. passim. 
4 Compare Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws para. 2, 
at 1, City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-2811 (S.D.N.Y. 
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mounting an attack on this category of market participants or see-
ing direct charges as a distraction, it still persisted with finger-
pointing at HFTs as unnamed violators: “Defendants wrongfully 
engaged in various fraudulent conduct and/or participated in 
such conduct by others ... including electronic front running, 
latency arbitrage, rebate arbitrage, spoofing, and layering.”5 
If anything, the availability of a private right of action to 
catch HFTs is critical for a number of reasons. For instance, 
securities exchanges, an important category of gatekeepers, are 
often sheltered from private lawsuits alleging securities fraud as 
self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) by the rather expansive—
but now contracting—doctrine of regulatory immunity.6 Moreover, 
                                                                                                            
Apr. 18, 2014) (maintaining that “a defendant class of sophisticated high fre-
quency trading ... firms,” along with other defendants, such as securities 
exchanges and brokerage firms, “employed devices, contrivances, manipula-
tions and artifices to defraud in a manner that was designed to and did ma-
nipulate the U.S. securities markets and the trading of equities on those 
markets, diverting billions of dollars annually from buyers and sellers of 
securities to themselves”), with Second Consolidated Amended Complaint for 
Violation of the Federal Securities Laws passim, City of Providence v. BATS 
Global Mkts., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02811-JMF (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter Second Consolidated Amended Complaint, City of Providence v. BATS 
Global Mkts., Inc.] (confining the lawsuit’s defendants to a group of securities 
exchanges and one dark pool operator). Although dismissed by the federal 
district court, this class action lawsuit was resurrected as stating a sufficient 
legal claim. In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 
126 F. Supp. 3d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. City 
of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017). 
5 Second Consolidated Amended Complaint, City of Providence v. BATS 
Global Mkts., Inc., supra note 4, para. 297, at 135. 
6 In a leading case dealing with liability of securities exchanges for HFT-
related practices, the federal district court ruled that providing private data feeds 
and complex order types were immune activities, while colocation services were 
not. In re Barclays Liquidity Cross, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 356–60. In its turn, the 
Second Circuit ruled that regulatory immunity does not apply when “an 
exchange engages in conduct to operate its own market that is distinct from 
its oversight role” and maintained that “the exchanges, in providing these 
[three types of] challenged products and services, did not ‘effectively stand in 
the shoes of the SEC’ and therefore are not entitled to the same protections of 
immunity that would otherwise be afforded to the SEC.” City of Providence, 
878 F.3d at 48 (quoting DL Capital Grp., LLC v. NASDAQ Stock Mkt., Inc., 
409 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2005)). The SEC also provided a reevaluation of the 
scope of regulatory immunity in its brief, although this analysis was not 
utilized by the Second Circuit. Id. at 47 n.4, 50 n.5. However, the regulatory 
agency maintained, quite similarly, that “immunity does not properly extend 
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other types of players are not immune in this area. For instance, 
certain non-exchange trading venues, meaning alternative trad-
ing systems (“ATSs”) that may take the form of dark pools or 
electronic communication networks (“ECNs”), have proven to be 
vulnerable to allegations of securities fraud.7 Likewise, private 
lawsuits based on such allegations against agency brokerage firms, 
including the giants among retail brokerages, in connection with 
breaches of the duty of best execution and payment for order 
flow and maker-taker arrangements are gaining momentum.8 
                                                                                                            
to functions performed by an exchange itself in the operation of its own mar-
ket, or to the sale of products and services arising out of those functions—like 
the challenged activities at the center of the plaintiffs’ allegations,” i.e., colo-
cation services, private data feeds, and complex order types, and furthermore 
argued that this doctrine should be confined to “the realm of member regula-
tion.” Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae at 3, 24, 
City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., No. 15-3057 (2d Cir. Nov. 28, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2016/providence-bats-global-markets 
-1116.pdf [https://perma.cc/JFR8-Y3YS]. As a related observation, the fusion 
of trading venues’ private regulatory regimes and specialized products raises 
the issue of whether it is truly possible to opt out of any product among pri-
vate data feeds, colocation services, and complex order types and still pursue 
a large subset of trading strategies, whether one is an HFT firm engaging in 
proprietary trading or an agency brokerage firm. For a sample of other recent 
cases addressing the issue of regulatory immunity of securities exchanges, 
see Rabin v. NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC, 182 F. Supp. 3d 220 (E.D. Pa. 2016), 
aff’d, No. 16-2511, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21093 (3d Cir. Oct. 25, 2017); Hunt-
ley v. Chi. Bd. of Options Exch., 161 F. Supp. 3d 612 (N.D. Ill. 2015); In re 
Facebook Inc., Sec. & Derivatives Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
7 For instance, one class action lawsuit against a dark pool for securities 
fraud under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 has already 
passed several procedural hurdles, although this controversy dealt with dis-
closure-based claims of the parent company’s shareholders rather than claims 
of that trading venue’s customers. Strougo v. Barclays PLC, 105 F. Supp. 3d 
330 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), class cert. granted, 312 F.R.D. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d 
sub nom. Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017). Moreover, 
an ECN was recently penalized for securities fraud under Section 17(a)(2) of 
the Securities Act of 1933, which was also based on disclosure-based claims. 
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10,014, Exchange 
Act Release No. 77,003, at 2 (Jan. 31, 2016) (settled proceeding), https:// 
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AXC-QB2A]. 
8 Notably, the lawsuits against Charles Schwab and TD Ameritrade have 
passed the motion to dismiss hurdle. Crago v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 16-
cv-03938-RS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215871 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017); Zola v. 
TD Ameritrade, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1055 (D. Neb. 2016). However, a similar 
lawsuit against another large retail brokerage firm, E*Trade, did not pass 
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A starting point is that many forms of HFT are in no way 
illegal, as they represent, in addition to specialization and exper-
tise of these market participants, the modern iteration of time, 
place, and information advantages in a fragmented architecture 
of securities markets. For instance, as observed by two commen-
tators, including the author, 
Overall, it is very problematic, if not futile, to outlaw such trad-
ing strategies [such as “order anticipation”/“liquidity detec-
tion” based on public information] and their latest incarnation, 
“stepping ahead,” but some manifestations of this phenomenon 
may be addressed through regulatory and market-based means, 
such as speed bumps, oversight of data feed latency, or venue-
specific policing for “aggressive” trading.9 
More generally, an adverse effect of certain trading strategies on 
other market participants in the zero-sum game of short-term 
trading does not automatically equate to fraudulent conduct. More-
over, it is often touted that HFTs have no clients and hence cannot 
abuse the latter’s orders.10 On the other hand, the principal-only 
model does not apply to every firm in this segment, as several key 
players perform an agency function by virtue of being off-exchange 
market makers that handle other broker-dealers’ order flow.11 No-
tably, in one of the most recent enforcement actions—which still 
is a true outlier so far—Citadel, a leading HFT, was penalized based 
on allegations of securities fraud under Section 17(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 for its off-exchange market making activi-
ties in connection with the utilization of discrepancies between 
                                                                                                            
that hurdle in the federal district court. Schwab v. E*TRADE Fin. Corp., No. 
16-cv-05891(JGK), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9844 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2018). 
9 BODEK & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 1, at 93. 
10 See, e.g., Rishi K. Narang, High-Frequency Traders Can’t Front-Run Anyone, 
CNBC (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/03/high-frequency-traders 
-cant-front-run-anyonecommentary.html [https://perma.cc/WET7-3YYD] (“HFTs 
never know what a customer’s order is before it’s in the market. HFTs have 
no customers. HFTs cannot front-run anyone.”). 
11 For an extensive discussion of the agency function of off-exchange mar-
ket makers performed in certain situations and the application of the duty of 
best execution to these market participants, as well as the securities fraud 
perspective on this duty, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, Wholesaling Best Execution: 
How Entangled Are Off-Exchange Market Makers?, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 149 
(2016). 
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the consolidated and private data feeds.12 Interestingly, while 
the doctrine of market manipulation as a form of securities 
fraud has a broad reach, this charge is essentially missing, at 
least in securities markets, for larger players in the HFT seg-
ment, as opposed to the typical scenario of a “point-and-click” 
trader often aided by some automated tool.13 
                                                                                                            
12 Citadel Sec. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10,280, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 79,790 (Jan. 13, 2017) (settled proceeding), https://www.sec.gov 
/litigation/admin/2017/33-10280.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY6A-N3WV]. On the 
other hand, this enforcement action was based on the existence of affirmative 
misrepresentations, which were made by Citadel as a de facto stand-alone 
trading venue, rather than breaches of the duty of best execution. The regula-
tors also observed that “the order often received price improvement, but this 
amount often was not sufficient to equal the price difference that had trig-
gered the [underlying] strategy,” which utilized discrepancies between the 
consolidated and private data feeds. Id. at 8. In turn, this observation raises 
the issue about the accuracy of price improvement statistics reported by 
off-exchange market makers. Another key observation from the settlement is 
the existence of built-in execution delays through a de facto conversion of mar-
ketable orders into nonmarketable orders, which, despite being sometimes 
advantageous to some orders, led to a subset of orders “receiv[ing] a price 
that was worse than they would have received” in the scenario of immediate 
execution. Id. at 9–10. For the author’s expanded analysis of this settlement, 
see Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Citadel Settlement, Off-Exchange Market Makers, 
and Giant Brokerages, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 5, 2017), http://cls 
bluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/05/05/the-citadel-settlement-off-exchange-mar 
ket-makers-and-giant-brokerages [https://perma.cc/6QDT-UKY3]. 
13 One example is represented by traders at a small firm who engaged in 
“manipulative trading known as ‘spoofing’ to collect [liquidity] rebates,” which 
was based on the usage of undisplayed order types and the lack of cancella-
tion fee for “customer” orders. Behruz Afshar, Securities Act Release No. 
10,094, Exchange Act Release No. 78,043, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 32,144, at 3, 12–16 (June 13, 2016) (settled proceeding), https://www.sec 
.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10094.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH8B-RNEB]. Another 
recent example involved “a day-trading firm [relying on] mostly foreign trad-
ers in Eastern Europe and Asia to conduct its trading” that allegedly “en-
gag[ed] in a manipulative trading strategy typically referred to as ‘layering’ 
or ‘spoofing’.” Complaint at 6, 11, SEC v. Lek Sec. Corp., No. 1:17-cv-01789-
DLC (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2017 
/comp-pr2017-63.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HTU-47Z9]. Interestingly, there have 
been instances in which manual traders had aimed to take advantage of 
certain algorithms, as illustrated by manipulative trading strategies that “the 
algorithms misinterpreted as reflecting sincere demand.” Hold Bros. On-Line 
Inv. Servs., LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67,924, Investment Company Act 
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However, time, place, and information advantages, which, 
in some form, are unavoidable, are only one part of the real story 
relevant for the purposes of identifying securities fraud. The phe-
nomenon of “plumbing” has to be considered as well: “[T]he arsenal 
of HFT has included numerous and often nontransparent mar-
ket structure shortcuts, as contrasted to true quantitative models, 
effectively allowing [such traders] to anticipate and respond to 
price moves.”14 The gamut of such shortcuts is indeed broad, and, 
oftentimes, selective disclosure of information by trading venues 
to preferred market participants has been involved: 
Features under the umbrella of plumbing may rely on tiered 
fees and rebates under the maker-taker pricing model, special 
order type advantages, fragmentation exploitation (e.g., jock-
eying for top-of-queue in order to trade or collect a rebate), 
market structure arbitrage, and de facto side-stepping the ban 
on locked and crossed markets and the trade-through rule es-
tablished by Regulation NMS. Overall, the existing regulatory 
framework, notably Regulation NMS, has been gamed by some 
HFTs and trading venues by: (i) exploiting regulatory loopholes 
and clever work-arounds, (ii) exploiting rule contradictions 
and unintended consequences, (iii) exploiting weakness in regu-
latory constraints resulting from implementation and / or la-
tency, (iv) exploiting liberal interpretation of grey areas and / 
or utilizing exceptions for purposes other than the original in-
tent, (v) exploiting undocumented or unanticipated features, 
and (vi) exploiting exchange membership status with regard to 
regulatory liability and eligibility for regulatory exceptions.15 
But perhaps it should not be surprising that bad actors in 
the HFT segment are hard to catch at least through the means 
of private lawsuits. Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and 
Rule 10b-5, a private right of action reaches only primary, but not 
secondary, violators, although the former may come in a variety 
of forms.16 In light of trading venues’ inadequate disclosures 
                                                                                                            
Release No. 30,213, at 5 (Sept. 25, 2012) (settled proceeding), https://www 
.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-67924.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2HK-XH5P]. 
14 Stanislav Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchants of Liquidity: Market Making 
from Crowded Floors to High-Frequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 651, 
701 (2016). 
15 BODEK & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 1, at 54–55. 
16 As observed in a key judicial opinion, “Secondary actors are subject to 
criminal penalties and civil enforcement by the SEC ... All secondary actors, 
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that enable questionable trading practices, the role played by 
HFTs may appear to be secondary from a doctrinal viewpoint.17 
More generally, HFTs may look like—and, in many instances, 
objectively are—just skillful beneficiaries courted by trading ven-
ues in a cutthroat environment created by the modern electronic 
marketplace. Moreover, another important scenario of frictions 
and imperfections in trading venues’ protocols does not involve 
collusion, but is rather based on utilizing “glitches,” which makes 
such HFTs look even less culpable. But this paradigm should 
not result in a blanket immunity, and a fresh perspective and an 
objective reevaluation of existing HFT practices from the stand-
point of securities fraud is very much needed in order to identify, 
penalize, and deter wrongful conduct. 
Accordingly, this Article analyzes approaches to attaching 
liability for securities fraud to HFTs as primary violators in con-
nection with the current market structure crisis. One of the 
manifestations of this crisis pertains to inadequate disclosure of 
advanced functionalities offered by trading venues, as exempli-
fied by the order type controversy. The Article’s analysis is applied 
to secret arrangements between trading venues and preferred 
traders, glitches and gaming, and the reach of the doctrine of mar-
ket manipulation, and several relevant issues are also viewed 
from the standpoint of the integrity of the trading process. The 
Article concludes by arguing for a balanced approach to catching 
certain problematic practices of HFTs as securities fraud. 
                                                                                                            
furthermore, are not necessarily immune from private suit ... [T]he implied 
right of action in § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] continues to cover secondary 
actors who commit primary violations.” Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008) (citation omitted). 
17 An important recent case, while addressing private claims against trad-
ing venues in connection with HFT practices rather than HFTs themselves, 
reminded that “Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 create liability only for primary 
violations of those provisions; there is no liability for aiding and abetting 
another’s violation.” In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trad-
ing Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 342, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). However, in its appellate 
iteration, the same case maintained that the plaintiffs had presented a suffi-
cient legal allegation that “the exchanges were co-participants with HFT firms in 
the manipulative scheme and profited by that scheme” as primary violators. 
City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 50–51 (2d Cir. 
2017). Importantly, this statement also points in the direction of the feasibility of 
liability of HFTs as primary violators at least in the context of this allegation. 
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I. ADVANCED FUNCTIONALITIES OFFERED BY TRADING 
VENUES AND THE ORDER TYPE CONTROVERSY 
Trading protocols govern the interaction of orders, such as 
setting matching procedures, queue priority, price anchors and 
other indicators, rebate-fee structures, and order visibility. While 
there is a hierarchy of rules, starting with the Exchange Act 
itself and various SEC regulations, the specifics of the trading 
process are largely determined by individual trading venues, SROs 
and non-SROs alike. The dominance of advanced functionalities 
characterizes the ever-increasing complexity of trading protocols 
offered by the evolving gamut of lit and dark venues, with some 
features merely replicating the preelectronic environment and 
others going far beyond it. 
The process of automation—accompanied by the rise of 
advanced functionalities—has not unambiguously simplified the 
marketplace of yesterday dominated by manual procedures with 
its uncertainty about human interaction. Concerns about com-
plexity are on the forefront: “The matching rules, e.g., definitions 
of order types and triggers for transitions into volatility auc-
tions, define how the venue transitions between states. ... The 
structure of a financial algorithm’s state space can be incredibly 
complex.”18 The problem of complexity is compounded by the very 
process of describing trading rules to regulatory agencies—for 
instance, in the process of regulatory review and approval—and 
market participants themselves: 
A significant challenge for regulators (and those trading on ex-
changes) is that the documentation and marketing material 
given to them is often imprecise. It is commonly expressed in 
English prose, an obviously deficient way to communicate 
complicated mathematical objects. English descriptions of al-
gorithms lead to ambiguity and open up opportunities for 
“liberal” interpretations.19 
Indeed, the very existence of such gray areas creates some room 
for both unintended and deliberate informational advantages. 
                                                                                                            
18 DENIS A. IGNATOVICH & GRANT O. PASSMORE, AESTHETIC INTEGRATION 
LTD., TRANSPARENT ORDER PRIORITY AND PRICING 3 (2015), https://www.imandra 
.ai/transparent-order-priority-and-pricing [https://perma.cc/5YHA-HWB8]. 
19 Id. at 5.  
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With these developments in mind, the so-called order type 
controversy is symptomatic of many advantages occurring in the 
modern market structure in connection with informational asym-
metries in advanced functionalities, which may range from merely 
undocumented gray areas to discrepancies with formal documenta-
tion that constitute direct contradictions.20 The basic taxonomy 
of order type-related abuses has been described as follows: 
? unfair order handling practices that permit HFTs 
to step ahead of investor orders in violation of 
price-time priority ? unfair rebooking and repositioning of investor or-
ders that permit HFTs to flip out of toxic trades ? unfair conversion of investor orders eligible for 
maker rebates into unfavorable executions incur-
ring taker fees ? unfair insertion of HFT intermediaries in between 
legitimate customer-to-customer matching ? unfair and discriminatory order handling of in-
vestor orders during sudden price movements.21 
Moreover, even some major institutional investors have openly ac-
knowledged the adverse impact of certain order types,22 although 
this perspective might cast some unfavorable light on this group 
for not using such order types more widely. 
                                                                                                            
20 Haim Bodek is rightfully credited with bringing the order type contro-
versy to light. For his discussion of this controversy in the context of HFT, see 
HAIM BODEK, THE PROBLEM OF HFT: COLLECTED WRITINGS ON HIGH FREQUENCY 
TRADING & STOCK MARKET STRUCTURE REFORM (2013). 
21 Id. at 11–12. 
22 See, e.g., High Frequency Trading’s Impact on the Economy: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban 
Affairs, 113th Cong. 69–70 (2014) (prepared statement of Andrew M. Brooks, 
Vice President and Head of U.S. Equity Trading, T. Rowe Price Associates, 
Inc.), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg91299/pdf/CHRG-113shrg 
91299.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY6F-YRKQ] (“[I]n the race for increased market 
share, exchanges and alternative trading venues continue to offer various 
types of orders to compete for investor order flow. Many of these order types 
facilitate strategies that can benefit certain market participants at the ex-
pense of long-term investors and, while seemingly appropriate, often such order 
types are used in connection with predatory trading strategies.”). 
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However, “unfair” does not necessarily translate to “ille-
gal.” In fact, the defining feature of the order type controversy is 
the existence of informational asymmetries combined with selec-
tive disclosure by trading venues to preferred market participants, 
as opposed to just disparities in market participants’ respective 
abilities to utilize certain order types. HFTs have not been just 
“better” at communicating with trading venues in a manner avail-
able to every interested party and investing time and effort to 
study the relevant documentation—in fact, individual firms have 
played a direct role in crafting specific order types. As this pro-
cess has been described from a trading venue’s perspective, “We 
created all these different order types to accommodate how [some 
market participants] wanted to trade. We tweaked how the order 
would interact with our book according to what they wanted. A 
lot of the unique orders were created at the request of a customer, 
typically a high frequency customer.”23 
The extent of informational asymmetries is illustrated by 
the following detailed list of undocumented features: 
a. precedence rules that advantage HFT order types 
over others (including conditions where price-time 
priority corruption occurs, and conditions where 
certain order type priority is firm, though other or-
der types are “re-posted” with new booking times); 
b. rules for “hiding” and “lighting” (including condi-
tions for maintaining a hidden state and triggers 
for lighting, and conditions where incoming orders 
have preference over “hidden” states or are sub-
ordinate to such “hidden” states ...); 
c. conditions for adherence to the SIP [Security In-
formation Processor] including the cases where 
an exchange will use direct feeds in conjunction 
with the SIP to determine “locking” and “light-
ing” conditions; 
                                                                                                            
23 SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS 
AND THE RIGGING OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKET 205 (rev. ed. 2013) (quoting an 
anonymous employee of Archipelago, which ultimately became NYSE Arca). 
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d. conditions and mechanisms where information 
about an exchange’s protected quotation state 
management, which normally would be expected 
to remain local to the exchange order matching 
engine, is communicated to HFTs in an advanta-
geous manner (i.e., mechanisms in which price 
sliding reject messages provide “re-posting” guid-
ance for HFTs); 
e. conditions of eligibility for maker/taker fees and 
rebates and conditions where fee transference 
occurs (including the conditions where nonmar-
ketable orders are re-posted to execute against 
special orders to incur taker fees); and 
f. the scenarios where the various price-sliding 
conditions are applied (with detail provided for 
both HFT order types and the common public 
customer order types), as well as full detail on 
conditions where “Post Only” orders in a hidden 
state may internally lock a market or otherwise 
gain precedence over other orders (including 
such properties as would apply to “Post Only” 
mid-point orders).24 
This conundrum also goes beyond “official” sets of order types: 
“Properties of different modifiers for the same order type may 
contradict each other or interact in a non-transparent and 
non-intuitive way.”25 In other words, certain combinations of 
modifiers may constitute de facto unique order types. While the 
line between “order types” and “modifiers” cannot be defined 
with absolute precision, this distinction could be utilized to hide 
the true functionality.26 
                                                                                                            
24 Haim Bodek, Reigniting the Order Type Debate: Haim Bodek Explains 
the Real Issues with ‘Undocumented’ Order Type Features, TABB F. (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/reigniting-the-order-type-debate-haim-bodek-ex 
plains-the-real-issues-with-%27undocumented%27-order-type-features [https:// 
perma.cc/A8S3-TSN3]. 
25 Haim Bodek & Stanislav Dolgopolov, A Summer of Order Type Filings 
and Regulatory Heat, MKT. STRUCTURE INSIGHTS (KOR Grp. LLC, New York, 
N.Y.), Sept. 2014, at 22, 23. 
26 Id. 
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The order type controversy also had an impact on the ac-
ademic field of market microstructure, although the focus often 
appears to be on actual functionalities of certain order types and 
the resulting complexity rather than inadequate disclosure.27 
Moreover, there is some emerging interest in the academic liter-
ature in the value of queue priority,28 and a specific case of this 
concept, colorfully described as “queue jumping,” is one of the 
manifestations of the order type controversy.29 As pointed out by 
a key HFT critic, queue priority is often based on market structure 
shortcuts rather than speed per se: “[A]lthough speed mattered, 
                                                                                                            
27 Compare Maureen O’Hara, High Frequency Market Microstructure, 116 
J. FIN. ECON. 257, 262 (2015) (“Exchanges use different order types to appeal 
to high frequency traders. For example, Direct Edge introduced Hide not 
Slide orders, a complex order type allowing submitters to circumvent rules 
designed to prevent locked markets. ... The queue-jumping feature of these 
orders elicited complaints that they unfairly disadvantage other traders. An 
alternative view is that these orders allow exchanges to compete with the 
algorithmic capabilities of broker-dealers by providing traders an enhanced 
ability to control the execution of their orders.”), and Craig Pirrong, Pick Your 
Poison—Fragmentation or Market Power? An Analysis of RegNMS, High Fre-
quency Trading, and Securities Market Structure, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 
2014, at 8, 12 (“[T]he prohibition on locked and crossed markets, and the 
provision for ‘market sweep orders’ in RegNMS have led to a proliferation of 
order types like the ‘hide and slide’. ... This proliferation of order types has 
increased the complexity of the markets, and this complexity gives HFT firms 
an advantage.”), with LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND ELECTRONIC MARKETS: 
WHAT INVESTMENT PROFESSIONALS NEED TO KNOW 73 (2015), http://www 
.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2470/rf.v2015.n4.1 [https://perma.cc/X46J-DJDP] (“In 
principle, the exchange can set its rules [relating to order types] as it pleases, 
subject to any regulatory oversight to which it may be subject. Potential problems 
arise, however, when the rules are not well known or, even more seriously, 
when they are not followed or when they are misrepresented to the public.”). 
28 For several examples of this trend, see Xin Guo et al., Dynamics of Or-
der Positions and Related Queues in a Limit Order Book (Oct. 14, 2015) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1505.048 
10v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG47-8D4W]; Ciamac C. Moallemi & Kai Yuan, A 
Model for Queue Position Valuation in a Limit Order Book (June 2017) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author), https://moallemi.com/ciamac 
/papers/queue-value-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/R36Q-L26A]; Spyros Skouras, 
The Value of Queue Priority (Dec. 12, 2012) (unpublished presentation) (on file 
with author), http://mms2014.globster.info/uploads/89_SKOURAS.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/E46L-KNP2]. 
29 The term “queue jumping,” which was coined by Haim Bodek, was brought 
to light in the Wall Street Journal’s initial exposure of the order type contro-
versy in 2012. Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, For Superfast Stock Traders, 
a Way to Jump Ahead in Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2012, at A1. 
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you could only reap the benefits if you knew what special order 
type to send and when to send it. In other words, speed was only a 
prerequisite.”30 In any instance, the advantage of speed is ap-
proaching its physical limits: “[A]s the differential between fast and 
slow players has compressed from minutes (20 years ago) to milli-
seconds or microseconds today, the benefit of latency becomes 
more random (uncertain) rather than deterministic (certain).”31 
The issue of order types has received attention in litiga-
tion from the standpoint of transparency and selective disclosure 
practices. For instance, in a leading class action lawsuit, the 
court acknowledged the allegations that “the Exchanges either 
did not disclose many of these order types to ordinary investors 
or marketed them exclusively to HFT firms, so that the ordinary 
investors were unaware of their existence.”32 Moreover, the ap-
pellate decision noted the allegations that some trading strategies 
may combine complex order types with colocation services and 
private data feeds and that “the exchanges may have told ordi-
nary investors about the existence of proprietary data feeds and 
colocation [but] did not publicly disclose the full range or cumu-
lative effect that such services would have on the market, the 
trading public, or the prices of securities.”33 
The order type controversy has been reflected in the SEC’s 
enforcement program. As one of the preliminary steps, a settlement 
between the SEC and NASDAQ covered non-compliance with “a 
fundamental rule governing order priority,” which was set by the 
exchange itself, as a violation of Section 19(g)(1) of the Exchange 
Act,34 which requires each SRO to “comply with the provisions of 
                                                                                                            
30 BODEK, supra note 20, at 8. 
31 Ashley N. Serrao et al., HFT 101 with Tradeworx, CREDIT SUISSE 2, 
(May 20, 2014), http://docplayer.net/20910101-U-s-market-structure.html [https:// 
perma.cc/H2WV-5G2C] (describing the view of Manoj Narang, CEO of Tradeworx). 
32 In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. 
Supp. 3d 342, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. City of 
Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017); see also 
BODEK & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 1, at 125 (“[T]he amended complaint did 
push the point of deficient disclosure by the securities exchanges with respect 
to complex order types and provided a taxonomy of investor harm from such 
order type-related practices.”). 
33 City of Providence, 878 F.3d at 43, 50. 
34 NASDAQ Stock Mkt., LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 69,655, at 2, 8 
(May 29, 2013) (settled proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013 
/34-69655.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XPA-RQQ4]. 
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this chapter [i.e., the Exchange Act], the rules and regulations 
thereunder, and its own rules.”35 A similar settlement censured 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange for “fail[ing] to adequately 
enforce its own rules, including its firm quote and priority rules,” 
as a violation of the same statutory provision.36 Yet another set-
tlement censured NYSE Arca for “executing Mid-Point Passive 
Liquidity Orders in a manner inconsistent with its rules,” also as a 
violation of the same statutory provision.37 However, all of these 
enforcement actions contained no allegations relating to symbiotic 
relationships between trading venues and their preferred market 
participants or, for that matter, allegations of securities fraud. 
Ultimately, the order type controversy is exemplified by the 
much-anticipated settlement with Direct Edge’s two exchanges, 
which went to the heart of the matter: 
Complete and accurate disclosure of an exchange’s order types 
and order handling procedures is necessary to promote a fair, 
orderly, and free and open market. ... When an exchange fails 
to completely and accurately describe its order types in its 
rules, it creates a significant risk that the manner in which 
those order types operate will not be understood by all market 
participants, thereby compromising the integrity and fairness 
of trading on that exchange. This risk is compounded when 
the exchange discloses information regarding the operation of 
those order types to some but not all of its members.38 
As discussed in the settlement, “Instead of a single price 
sliding process as described in their rules, the Exchanges accepted 
                                                                                                            
35 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(1) (2016). 
36 Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 69,726, at 19 
(June 11, 2013) (settled proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013 
/34-69726.pdf [https://perma.cc/229F-NCY3]. 
37 N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 72,065, at 17 (May 1, 
2014) (settled proceeding), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34-72065 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2CE-3UHL]. 
38 EDGA Exch. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,032, at 2 (Jan. 12, 2015) (set-
tled proceeding), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74032.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/QD2L-CXBL]. On the other hand, the SEC closed its related investiga-
tion of the other two exchanges owned by the same group, BATS Exchange and 
BATS Y-Exchange. Letter from Kathryn A. Pyszka, Assistant Regional Dir., 
Chi. Regional Office, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Eric Swanson, Gen. Counsel, 
BATS Global Mkts., Inc. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources 
/regulation/SEC_BATS_Closeout_Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc /ZG42-7LYM]. 
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three different price sliding order types, called ‘Single Re-Price,’ 
‘Price Adjust,’ and ‘Hide Not Slide’.”39 Importantly, this enforce-
ment action referenced the existence of two HFT firms actively 
involved with requesting, if not designing, specific queue posi-
tion-related functionalities,40 and one of them even “advised 
Direct Edge that implementation of [the requested] order type 
would likely cause it to increase the order flow that it sent to 
Direct Edge from 4–5 million orders per day to 12–15 million 
orders per day.”41 There are additional illustrations of mutually 
beneficial arrangements for Direct Edge and preferred traders: 
For users of HNS [Hide Not Slide], HNS orders would have 
execution priority over MPM [Midpoint Match] orders, as well 
as over other price slid orders when the other price slid orders 
were unslid, re-priced and ranked at the original locking price. 
For Direct Edge, the revised logic would allow more execu-
tions to occur on EDGX and would also increase Direct Edge’s 
revenue on EDGX by virtue of both the increase in executions 
and by charging taker fees to both the HNS and MPM orders 
on transactions executing at the NBBO [National Best Bid 
and Offer] mid-point, as opposed to charging one order a taker 
fee but having to pay a rebate to the other order.42 
Importantly, some of the rules of these exchanges were 
unambiguously inaccurate, as shown by the following example: 
[T]he Exchanges’ rules did not state that an order subject to 
the “displayed price sliding process” would be repriced/ranked 
to one minimum price variation away from the locking price. 
The Exchanges’ rules also provided that, in the event the 
NBBO changed, “the order will receive a new timestamp and 
will be displayed at the original locking price.” However, a 
Single Re-Price order was not unslid and displayed at the 
original locking price.43 
While public disclosure of technical specifications perhaps could 
have been sufficient to deflect at least some potential allegations 
of false or misleading misrepresentations, the approach that the 
                                                                                                            
39 EDGA Exch., at 3. 
40 For the description of the roles played by “Trading Firm A” and “Trading 
Firm B,” see id. at 7–10. 
41 Id. at 7. 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 Id. at 15. 
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SEC decided not to employ, it was not enough to address other 
charges: “Technical specifications are not a substitute for ex-
change rules and do not satisfy an exchange’s obligation to sub-
mit proposed rules and proposed rule changes under Section 
19(b) of the Exchange Act.”44 In any instance, “although the Ex-
changes provided some information about priority and other 
characteristics of HNS in technical specifications made available 
to members, the technical specifications did not contain complete 
and accurate information regarding the operation of HNS.”45 In 
addition to charges under Section 19(g)(1) of the Exchange Act, 
this enforcement action pointed to violations of Section 19(b)(1) 
in connection with the requirements of the rulemaking process for 
SROs.46 Ultimately, the very essence of this enforcement action 
contradicts an earlier inside claim that “[p]rice-slide orders ... 
don’t suit predatory HFT.”47 
Another enforcement action, which also precisely addressed 
the essence of the order type controversy, was directed against a 
dark pool run by UBS.48 Once again, inadequate disclosure was 
involved: “UBS ... fail[ed] to disclose [the] PPP [order type] to all 
UBS ATS subscribers. Although it was eventually disclosed to 
most subscribers, PPP was pitched almost exclusively to market 
makers and/or high-frequency trading firms, which UBS ex-
pected to be the primary users of the order type.”49 The hidden 
subpenny functionality associated with this order type, which 
could be seen as another mechanism of queue jumping, “allowed 
one subscriber to gain execution priority over another in the 
order queue by offering to pay an economically insignificant 
sub-penny more per share [in violation of Rule 612 of Regulation 
                                                                                                            
44 Id. at 3 n.4. 
45 Id. at 3. For instance, “with respect to EDGX, the specifications incor-
rectly stated that HNS orders were ranked at the locking price when, in fact, 
they were ranked at the midpoint of the NBBO and had discretion to execute 
to the locking price in certain circumstances.” Id. at 13. 
46 Id. at 17–18. 
47 Phil Mackintosh, Demystifying Order Types, KCG HOLDINGS, INC. 13 
(Sept. 2014), http://www.smallake.kr/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/KCG_Demysti 
fying-Order-Types_092414.pdf [https://perma.cc/58ZV-F4GT]. 
48 UBS Sec. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9697, Exchange Act Release 
No. 74,060 (Jan. 15, 2015) (settled proceeding), http://www.sec.gov/litigation 
/admin/2015/33-9697.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EA8-HQTG]. 
49 Id. at 3. 
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NMS].”50 The SEC also observed that the dark pool’s “Form ATS 
[filed with the SEC] indicated that UBS ATS complied with Rule 
612.”51 Moreover, the impact of this order type extended beyond 
the dark pool itself, which highlights the nature of symbiotic 
relationships between trading venues and preferred traders: 
“[B]ecause UBS ATS allowed its subscribers to place orders at 
prices that were unavailable at ATSs and exchanges that com-
plied with Rule 612 of Regulation [NMS], UBS ATS obtained an 
unfair competitive advantage over those venues in its efforts to 
attract and execute orders from market participants.”52 The vio-
lations relevant for this order type included the failure to file 
disclosure forms with the SEC, the existence of the subpenny 
functionality in contravention of Rule 612 of Regulation NMS, 
and false and misleading statements as a form of securities fraud 
under Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.53 
                                                                                                            
50 Id. at 6. Other enforcement actions are similar in this respect. For in-
stance, a settlement between the SEC and Credit Suisse addressed instances 
when Crossfinder, a dark pool, “accepted and ranked tens of millions of or-
ders priced in sub-penny increments [which] were generated through the use 
of three tags applied to orders destined for the ATS.” Credit Suisse Sec. 
(USA) LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10,013, Exchange Act Release No. 
77,002, at 7 (Jan. 31, 2016) (settled proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/litiga 
tion/admin/2016/33-10013.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA4G-NX8E]. The SEC observed 
that “the order tags that enabled sub-penny orders facilitated the very result that 
Rule 612 was designed to prevent: allowing one subscriber to obtain priority 
over another who had placed an earlier order by offering to pay an economi-
cally insignificant amount.” Id. Moreover, Credit Suisse’s personnel advised 
certain subscribers how to get this functionality accepted by the system and 
“use the order tags to place orders that would have priority over orders placed 
earlier in time but that were pegged exactly to the bid or the offer.” Id. 
51 UBS Sec., at 5. Although not entirely clear from the facts in the settle-
ment, it is also likely that the dark pool’s representations disseminated to at 
least some customers included statements essentially confirming compliance 
with the subpenny ban. Although earlier versions from the relevant period 
are not in the public domain, a later version of the general rules of this dark 
pool stressed that “[s]ub-penny executions will not occur except at the midpoint 
unless the stock is trading below $1.00.” UBS ATS, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 7 
(rev. July 16, 2014). 
52 UBS Sec., at 6. 
53 Id. at 14–15. As illustrated by this enforcement action, there may be se-
rious consequences relating to allegations of securities fraud even in the con-
text of settlements. See Letter from David C. Bohan, Katten Muchin Rosenman 
LLP, to Mary J. Kosterlitz, Chief of the Office of Enforcement Liaison, Div. of 
 
570 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:551 
This string of enforcement actions needs to be considered 
in conjunction with the process of review and reassessment of 
order type practices by trading venues themselves, especially equi-
ties exchanges. The cleanup of order type practices by trading 
venues, whether seen as a voluntary or forced initiative, had started 
around 2012,54 intensifying rather dramatically two years later. 
One may point to “the phenomenon of comprehensive order 
type-focused rule filings by equities exchanges, which purport to 
enhance disclosure and provide more clarity, while often main-
taining that no or little substantive change is being proposed.”55 
                                                                                                            
Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1, 3 (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.sec.gov 
/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2015/ubs-ag-011515-405.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/ESH2-D6CD] (requesting the SEC to “determine that UBS AG shall not be 
considered an ‘ineligible issuer’ as defined in Rule 405 [under the Securities 
Act of 1933] as a result of the cease-and-desist order,” given the allegations of 
violations of “the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws” in con-
nection with the settlement on UBS’s dark pool). 
54 See BODEK, supra note 20, at 49 (“When one reviews market structure 
changes in [2012], one might note that a number of egregious practices appear to 
have been eliminated from the exchanges. Specific cases include normaliza-
tion of binary and FIX protocols, prohibition of queue jumping on orders that 
‘hide and light,’ and the levying of taker fees for aggressively priced Post 
Only orders.”). 
55 BODEK & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 1, at 57–58. For a description of this 
wave of comprehensive order type-related rule filings, see id. at 57–59. As men-
tioned above, quite a few rule filings have asserted—with some variations—that 
no substantive change had been proposed. See, e.g., Notice of Filing of a Pro-
posed Rule Change by BATS Exchange, Inc. to Amend Rules 11.9, 11.12, and 
11.13, Exchange Act Release No. 74,247, 80 Fed. Reg. 8720, 8721 (Feb. 11, 2015), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-02-18/pdf/2015-03222.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/3GPJ-CKCL] (“The proposals ... are the product of a comprehensive 
review of Exchange system functionality conducted by the Exchange and are 
intended to add additional clarity and specificity regarding the current func-
tionality of the Exchange’s System, including the operation of its order types 
and order instructions. The Exchange is not proposing any substantive modi-
fications to the System.”) (footnote omitted); Notice of Filing of a Proposed 
Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC Amending Rule 13 and Re-
lated Rules Governing Order Types and Modifiers to Clarify the Nature of 
Order Types, Exchange Act Release No. 73,703, 79 Fed. Reg. 72,039, 72,040 
(Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-04/pdf/2014-28476 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2X7-R99R] (“The Exchange proposes to provide addi-
tional clarity to Rule 13 by regrouping and re-numbering current rule text 
and making other non-substantive, clarifying changes. The proposed rule changes 
are not intended to reflect changes to functionality but rather to clarify Rule 
 
2018] SECURITIES FRAUD IN THE MARKET 571 
As another illustration, pursuant to a request by the regulators, 
every equities exchange had adopted rules clarifying its respec-
tive market data usage, which were approved within a two-day 
span.56 One of the specific areas articulated by the regulators in 
                                                                                                            
13 to make it easier to navigate. In addition, the Exchange proposes to amend 
certain rules to remove references to functionality that is no longer opera-
tive.”) (footnote omitted); Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change by 
EDGX Exchange, Inc. Relating to Include Additional Specificity Within Rule 
1.5 and Chapter XI Regarding Current System Functionality Including the 
Operation of Order Types and Order Instructions, Exchange Act Release No. 
72,676, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,520, 44,520 (July 25, 2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/FR-2014-07-31/pdf/2014-17989.pdf [https://perma.cc/37GT-ZQKP] (“[With 
limited exceptions] the Exchange does not propose to substantively modify 
the operation of any of the current defined order types or terms or the opera-
tion of the System; rather, it intends to provide additional specificity and 
transparency to Members, Users, and the investing public regarding the 
Exchange’s order types and system functionality, and to organize its rules in 
a more intuitive and less complex manner.”). 
56 For the complete list of the filings made by every equities exchange, see 
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by 
Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc. Concerning the Use of Market Data Feeds by 
the Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 72,711, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,570 (July 29, 
2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-05/pdf/2014-18385.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BG3G-2HPE]; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a 
Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc. to Disclose Publicly the 
Sources of Data Used for Exchange Functions, Exchange Act Release No. 
72,712, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,521 (July 29, 2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR 
-2014-08-05/pdf/2014-18386.pdf [https://perma.cc/4368-XN49]; Notice of Filing 
and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ OMX 
PHLX LLC to Disclose Publicly the Sources of Data Used for Exchange Func-
tions, Exchange Act Release No. 72,713, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,544 (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-05/pdf/2014-18387.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/7EXP-54A6]; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed 
Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC Clarifying the Exchange’s 
Use of Certain Data Feeds for Order Handling and Execution, Order Routing, 
and Regulatory Compliance, Exchange Act Release No. 72,710, 79 Fed. Reg. 
45,511 (July 29, 2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-05/pdf/2014 
-18384.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT94-X2LX]; Notice of Filing and Immediate 
Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by NYSE Arca, Inc. Clarifying the 
Exchange’s Use of Certain Data Feeds for Order Handling and Execution, 
Order Routing, and Regulatory Compliance, Exchange Act Release No. 
72,708, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,572 (July 29, 2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR 
-2014-08-05/pdf/2014-18382.pdf [https://perma.cc/AA8D-Q46G]; Notice of Filing 
and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by NYSE MKT LLC 
Clarifying the Exchange’s Use of Certain Data Feeds for Order Handling and 
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this request related to “order handling and execution (e.g., with 
pegged or midpoint orders),” as well as order routing more gen-
erally,57 and some commentators subsequently criticized a few of 
the adopted rules.58 These changes also strike at the heart of the 
                                                                                                            
Execution, Order Routing, and Regulatory Compliance, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 72,709, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,513 (July 29, 2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
/pkg/FR-2014-08-05/pdf/2014-18383.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN25-S9GX]; Notice 
of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by BATS 
Exchange, Inc. to Clarify for Members and Non-Members the Use of Certain 
Data Feeds for Order Handling and Execution, Order Routing and Regulatory 
Compliance, Exchange Act Release No. 72,685, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,889 (July 28, 
2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-01/pdf/2014-18120.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XK8L-32AK]; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Pro-
posed Rule Change by BATS Y-Exchange, Inc. to Clarify for Members and Non-
Members the Use of Certain Data Feeds for Order Handling and Execution, 
Order Routing and Regulatory Compliance, Exchange Act Release No. 72,687, 
79 Fed. Reg. 44,926 (July 28, 2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-01 
/pdf/2014-18122.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XMG-K2PN]; Notice of Filing and Im-
mediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by EDGA Exchange, Inc. to 
Clarify for Members and Non-Members the Use of Certain Data Feeds for 
Order Handling and Execution, Order Routing and Regulatory Compliance, 
Exchange Act Release No. 72,682, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,938 (July 28, 2014), http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-01/pdf/2014-18117.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/8RW3-EVM4]; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed 
Rule Change by EDGX Exchange, Inc. to Clarify for Members and Non-
Members the Use of Certain Data Feeds for Order Handling and Execution, 
Order Routing and Regulatory Compliance, Exchange Act Release No. 72,683, 
79 Fed. Reg. 44,950 (July 28, 2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08 
-01/pdf/2014-18118.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX67-QUGW]; Notice of Filing and 
Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ Stock Market 
LLC to Disclose Publicly the Sources of Data Used for Exchange Functions, 
Exchange Act Release No. 72,684, 79 Fed. Reg. 44,956 (July 28, 2014), http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-01/pdf/2014-18119.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/5LF8-32YG]. 
57 Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change by 
NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, 79 Fed. Reg. at 44,956 (quoting Letter from Stephen 
Luparello, Dir., Div. of Trading & Mkts., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Robert 
Greifeld, Chief. Exec. Officer, NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. (June 20, 2014)). 
58 See, e.g., Donald Bollerman, Head of Mkt. Operations, IEX ATS, Com-
ment Letter to the SEC on the Rule Filings by BATS Exchange Inc. and 
BATS Y-Exchange Relating to the Use of Certain Data Feeds 2–3 (Sept. 25, 
2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-bats-2014-029/bats2014029-3.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/WP9E-8UUX] (pointing out that BATS Exchange and BATS Y-Exchange 
“represent that for purposes of determining the NBBO [National Best Bid 
and Offer] for pegged orders, or the PBBO [Pegged Best Bid and Offer], they 
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heated exchange between William O’Brien of the combined 
BATS-Direct Edge and Brad Katsuyama of IEX, which later led 
to a correction of O’Brien’s statements by his company—with 
some pressure apparently exerted by the Attorney General of 
the State of New York—regarding the use of the (slower) consol-
idated and (faster) private data feeds for pricing purposes in 
Direct Edge’s order matching engine.59 Moreover, there have been 
subsequent data feed-related clarifications.60 Furthermore, secu-
rities exchanges are not the only ones providing additional disclo-
sure relating to their order type practices. Amidst repeated calls 
to apply the same logic to ATSs,61 the trend of enhanced disclosure 
                                                                                                            
require their systems to receive their own quotes from the SIP feeds” and 
stating that “it appears probable that the NBBO and PBBO at certain points 
in time will be out of alignment”). 
59 For sources describing this incident, see Bob Pisani, BATS Clarifies 
Statement Made on CNBC, CNBC (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014 
/04/04/bats-clarifies-statement-made-on-cnbc.html [https://perma.cc/8ARB-HL 
CE]; Rob Wile, BATS Exchange Forced to Retract Statement Its President 
Made on CNBC, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com 
/bats-forced-to-retract-presidents-statement-from-cnbc-tussle-2014-4 [https://per 
ma.cc/U8ZC-5XY4]. 
60 For a sample of such additional clarifications, see Notice of Filing and 
Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ Stock Market, 
LLC to Update Public Disclosure of Exchange Usage of Market Data, Exchange 
Act Release No. 74,690, 80 Fed. Reg. 20,282 (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.gpo 
.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-15/pdf/2015-08545.pdf [https://perma.cc/33U2-CBC5]; 
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by 
New York Stock Exchange LLC Specifying in Exchange Rules the Exchange’s 
Use of Certain Data Feeds for Order Handling and Execution, Order Routing, 
and Regulatory Compliance, Exchange Act Release No. 74,410, 80 Fed. Reg. 
12,240 (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-03-06/pdf/2015 
-05164.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA5P-W59E]; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effec-
tiveness of a Proposed Rule Change by Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc. Concerning 
the Use of Market Data Feeds by the Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 
74,357, 80 Fed. Reg. 11,252 (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg 
/FR-2015-03-02/pdf/2015-04181.pdf [https://perma.cc /2E25-CY9A]. 
61 See, e.g., The Role of Regulation in Shaping Equity Market Structure and 
Electronic Trading: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban 
Affairs, 113th Cong. 66 (2015) (prepared statement of Joe Ratterman), http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg91300/pdf/CHRG-113shrg91300.pdf [http: 
//perma.cc/9TM2-9LHL] (stating that “additional steps could be considered to 
require ATSs to provide customers with their rules of operation, which would 
include order types, eligible participant and participant tiers, all forms of 
data feed products, and order-routing logic and eligible routing venues.”); 
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by such entities, often manifested in releasing updated Form ATS 
filings and making them publicly available, is plainly visible.62 
This trend is also reinforced by the SEC’s proposal that would, 
among other things, require operators of ATSs “to provide de-
tailed information about the manner of operations of the ATS [in 
question]” and “to make filings on Form ATS-N public.”63 
On the other hand, some order type-related changes in-
troduced by trading venues still generate controversy. One recent 
contentious change is represented by the SEC’s approval of the 
much-debated order type changes at the New York Stock Exchange 
and NYSE MKT relating to the “add liquidity only” modifier and 
its usage in intermarket sweep orders.64 The critics of these 
changes maintained that the provided disclosure was inadequate, 
the usage of intermarket sweep orders was contrary to Regulation 
                                                                                                            
Computerized Trading: What Should the Rules of the Road Be?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
& Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 70 (2013) (prepared statement of Larry Tabb, CEO, 
TABB Group), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg80168/pdf/CHRG 
-112shrg80168.pdf [https://perma.cc/M25R-WRSZ] (arguing that “[e]xchanges, 
and for that matter ATSs, ECNs, internalizers and even brokers need to begin to 
provide greater transparency, descriptions, and concrete examples of how each 
order type works, how fees/rebates are generated, where they show up in the 
book queue, how and when they route out, and how these order types change 
under the various market conditions”); FIA PRINCIPAL TRADERS GRP. (FIA 
PTG), EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE POSITION PAPER 3 (Sept. 30, 2014), http:// 
www.futuresindustry.org/ptg/downloads/FIA%20PTG%20Equity%20Market 
%20Structure%20Postion%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NWY-ALJS] (favoring 
reform to enhance transparency, including order type practices, with respect to 
“all market participants in all operational aspects of trading venues, including 
exchanges, ATSs and dark pools”). 
62 For a discussion of the phenomenon of additional disclosure by dark 
pools, which represent the bulk of ATSs, see Bradley Hope & Scott Patterson, 
Dark Pools Shed Light on Their Operations, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2014, at C2. 
63 Regulation of NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act 
Release No. 76,474, 80 Fed. Reg. 80,998, 80,998 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242 & 249), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015 
-12-28/pdf/2015-29890.pdf [https://perma.cc/64CA-NE6P]. 
64 Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by New York Stock Exchange 
LLC and NYSE MKT LLC Amending Exchange Rule 13 to Make the Add 
Liquidity Only Modifier Available for Limit Orders, and Make the Day Time-
in-Force Condition and Add Liquidity Only Modifier Available for Intermarket 
Sweep Orders, Exchange Act Release No. 73,333, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,223 (Oct. 9, 
2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-10-16/pdf/2014-24547.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3FFY-ACWZ]. 
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NMS, and the likely usage would be beneficial to HFTs at the 
expense of other market participants.65 Yet another example is 
provided by the discretionary peg order type that serves as one 
of the key features of IEX, a trading venue that could be de-
scribed as a response to the market structure crisis, and this 
order type had received a great deal of attention during the pro-
cess of IEX’s approval as a securities exchange.66 
Overall, the order type controversy has exposed trading 
venues to liability, sometimes solely for not following proper rule-
making procedures, but in some other cases also for securities 
fraud. More recently, securities exchanges as SROs have been 
proven to be vulnerable to private lawsuits in connection with their 
order type practices, as a key appellate decision pronounced 
these functionalities as not constituting “regulatory commands by 
the exchanges compelling traders to behave in certain ways” and 
hence outside the scope of regulatory immunity.67 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                            
65 For this polemic between the exchange group and its critics, see Com-
ments on NYSE Rulemaking: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending 
Rule 13 To Make the Add Liquidity Only Modifier Available for Additional 
Limit Orders and Make the Day Time-In-Force Condition Available for Inter-
market Sweep Orders [Release No. 34-72548; File No. SR-NYSE-2014-32], U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2014-32/nyse 
201432.shtml [https://perma.cc/SEN2-6S5S] (last modified Oct. 9, 2014). 
66 For the SEC’s discussion of the discretionary peg order type and the ar-
guments offered by its proponents and opponents, see Application of Investors’ 
Exchange, LLC for Registration as a National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act 
Release No. 78,101, 81 Fed. Reg. 41,142, 41,152–53 (June 17, 2016), https:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-06-23/pdf/2016-14875.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/X9AC-8VYR]. 
67 City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 47–48 (2d 
Cir. 2017). Furthermore, the SEC made a similar conclusion in its brief: 
“[Order type] offerings now bear more resemblance to products and services 
like co-location and proprietary feeds than to member regulation.” Brief of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, City of Providence 
v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., supra note 6, at 30. This potentially forward-
looking position taken by the SEC, as the agency responsible for enforcing the 
Exchange Act, raises a number of entwined issues about the nature and 
strength of the deference that should be accorded by the federal courts to this 
interpretation of the doctrine of regulatory immunity in the form of an ami-
cus brief and the scope of this interpretation of a somewhat blurry concept 
with respect to the statute as a whole, its specific provisions, or even specific 
rules of general application promulgated by the SEC, such as Rule 10b-5 
itself. See Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 798 F.3d 1172, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(“An agency’s interpretation of the statute—when presented in an amicus 
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sheer volume of cleanup by trading venues gives some idea about 
the prior state of opacity, potential trading profits, and opportu-
nities for selective disclosure as a tool for courting and retaining 
preferred traders. Also, it is an encouraging sign that some regula-
tory changes and reform proposals in the market structure space 
have been viewed through the order type lens.68 Likewise, there 
                                                                                                            
brief—is not promulgated in the exercise of its formal rule-making authority, 
so no Chevron deference is warranted. Even if the terms ‘goods,’ ‘services,’ and 
‘facilities’ also appear in the regulation, CFPB [Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau] is in fact interpreting Congress’s words in the statute, so we 
give no deference to CFPB’s interpretation. In addition, because the statutory 
terms at issue are not ambiguous, no deference is merited.” (internal citations 
omitted) (referencing the deference standard established by Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); State of Connecticut 
Office of Prot. & Advocacy for Pers. with Disabilities v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 
464 F.3d 229, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Where ... an agency advances a statu-
tory interpretation in an amicus brief that has not been articulated before in 
a rule or regulation, we do not apply the high level of deference due under 
Chevron ... [But] a reasonable agency determination, when advanced in an 
amicus brief that is not a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ [under Auer] ... may be 
entitled to some deference on account of the ‘specialized experience’ and in-
formation available to the agency. Under Skidmore, the weight we give an 
agency’s judgment is based on ‘the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.’” (internal citations omitted) (referencing the deference standards estab-
lished by Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944)); Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 416 n.35 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The 
most important reason for extending greater deference to an amicus brief that 
purports to interpret an agency’s own ambiguous regulation (under Auer), 
than a brief that interprets the organic statute directly (under Chevron), is 
the greater expertise and familiarity of the agency with respect to the history 
and content of its own enacted rules.” (referencing the deference standards 
established by Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Chevron, 467 U.S. 
837). In any instance, this interpretation, given its seeming novelty, is likely to 
receive a great deal of attention of the federal courts, as well as other parties. 
68 See, e.g., FIA PRINCIPAL TRADERS GRP., SIMPLIFYING U.S. EQUITY MARKET 
STRUCTURE 2 (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.futuresindustry.org/ptg/downloads 
/FIA%20PTG%20Position%20-%20Simplifying%20US%20Equity%20Market%20 
Structure.pdf [https://perma.cc/LR5G-BKRA] (“[W]e recommend simply elim-
inating the trade through rule and the related prohibition on locked and 
crossed markets [which would, among other things] reduc[e] the need for 
hundreds of exchange order types that are used today to prevent locks, crosses 
and trade-throughs. ...”); Larry Tabb, Trade-At: Reducing Competition, Increasing 
Complexity and Channeling Profits to Intermediaries, TABB F. (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/trade-at-reducing-competition-increasing-com 
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is a greater awareness of the argument addressing additional com-
plexity introduced by expanding order type menus.69 At the same 
time, the nature and extent of potential liability of market partici-
pants themselves, such as HFTs, tend to remain a more tangential 
issue, perhaps being obscured by the focus on trading venues. 
II.  SECRET ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN TRADING 
VENUES AND PREFERRED TRADERS 
The phenomenon of secret arrangements between trading 
venues and preferred traders relating to the nature of certain 
functionalities is chiefly illustrated by the order type controversy. 
                                                                                                            
plexity-and-channeling-profits-to-intermediaries [https://perma.cc/4HZC-XGFC] 
(“Trade-At will spawn a whole new generation of complex order types, in-
creasing the gulf between those that properly implement these messages and 
those that don’t.”); R.T. Leuchtkafer (pseud.), Comment Letter to the SEC on 
MIDAS 2 (May 15, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/equity-market-struc 
ture-2013/equitymarketstructure2013-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/72BZ-UUWE] 
(“MIDAS has almost no information on order types and order modifiers other 
than the obvious fact [that] it contains only displayed orders [while many 
orders] are not displayed or are at best conditionally displayed.”). 
69 Compare Richie Prager, Managing Dir. & Head of Trading & Liquidity 
Strategies, et al., BlackRock, Inc., Comment Letter to the SEC on Equity Market 
Structure and Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity 5–6 (Sept. 12, 
2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-419.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/YB6J-WZU6] (“Proliferation in exchange order types has been another key 
contributor to market complexity. Many order types are designed to comply 
with regulations or promote liquidity. However, the interaction between these 
complex instructions gives rise to a labyrinthine rulebook of order priority 
and matching engine logic complicating the ability of regulators, exchanges 
and investors to fully understand the interactions and consequences.”), and 
PETER KOVAC, FLASH BOYS: NOT SO FAST: AN INSIDER’S PERSPECTIVE ON 
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 106 (2014) (“While each order type may be useful 
to someone, the overall effect is that they create a rat’s nest of complexity 
that only gets worse over time.”), and COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., THE 
U.S. EQUITY MARKETS: A PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM 132 (July 2016), 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/08_08_FINAL_DRAFT 
_EMS_REPORT-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/32E7-LCZU] (“The complexity of order 
types and maker-taker pricing schedules also makes it difficult for exchanges 
to meet their Exchange Act obligation to clearly describe their rules and pro-
posed rule changes in public filings.”), with Mackintosh, supra note 47, at 6, 9 
(“A similarity of many complex order types is (ironically) that they simplify 
other aspects of the market [e]ither by reducing message traffic or reducing 
order handling or helping with fee control and routing. ... [A] simplification of 
order types is more complex than you think.”). 
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Importantly, this paradigm puts limitations on the articulated 
strengths of electronic order matching engines that are said to 
“enforce the exchange’s trading order precedence and pricing rules 
without error or exception, and they never favor friends or con-
federates [and] keep [supported hidden] orders perfectly hidden 
[without] inadvertently or fraudulently reveal[ing] [such orders] 
to friends or confederates.”70 However, some commentators are 
still of the opinion that HFTs themselves, even when complicit 
with trading venues, are entirely off the hook in terms of their 
legal liability: 
If an exchange pulls me over to the side and says, “I see you’re 
using XYZ order type. If you want us to modify that order 
type in a specific way or you want us to create another order 
type that I won’t tell anyone about, will that swing more of 
your order flow to my exchange?”—in that situation, the HFT 
[as opposed to the exchange] hasn’t done anything wrong.71 
This reading is not correct, as HFTs themselves could at least be 
held liable as aiding and abetting securities fraud for a false or 
misleading disclosure released by the trading venue in question. 
On the other hand, attaching primary liability, as opposed to sec-
ondary liability, is no easy task. For instance, HFTs are likely to 
be outside the definition of primary violators as makers of false 
and misleading statements made by trading venues even if such 
market participants had offered a hand in designing functionali-
ties and crafting disclosures in question.72 From the standpoint 
                                                                                                            
70 HARRIS, supra note 27, at 37. 
71 Anthony Malakian, Dark Pools in the Firing Line, WATERS TECH. 
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.waterstechnology.com/waters/feature/2362568/dark 
-pools-in-the-firing-line [https://perma.cc/Q4HR-GG75] (registration required) 
(quoting Larry Tabb, Tabb Group). 
72 According to Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 
U.S. 2296 (2011), decided in the context of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and Rule 10b-5, there are substantial limitations to being characterized as a 
“maker” of a particular statement, despite potential participation. For the au-
thor’s discussion of Janus in connection with the order type controversy and 
HFT, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the 
Evolution of the Securities Market Structure: One Whistleblower’s Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 145, 160 n.80 [herein-
after Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the Evolution of 
the Securities Market Structure]. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008), a key precursor to Janus, similarly 
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of potential defenses, an even more important consideration is 
that HFTs may simply be recipients of selectively disclosed in-
formation without prior involvement of any kind. Likewise, infor-
mation about the very mechanics of the trading process, as opposed 
to direct disclosure of information about specific orders, is argu-
ably different from true inside/price-moving information about secu-
rities and underlying companies, although there may be approaches 
to inferring the existence of “hidden” trading interest.73 
For considering scenarios of liability of users of certain order 
types as primary violators, the following taxonomy may be em-
ployed: (1) an order type has merely undocumented features; (2) an 
order type has undocumented features that violate some regula-
tory norm under federal securities law, such as Regulation NMS 
or another SEC rule; and (3) the actual functioning of an order 
type contradicts its formal documentation available to the gen-
eral public or users, such as SRO filings, rulebook/trading proce-
dure disclosures, and technical manuals.74 Importantly, trading 
venues make explicit representations about the functioning of 
                                                                                                            
restricted the circle of potential primary violators under the concept of 
“scheme liability.” For a recent update on the scheme liability case law, see 
W. Va. Pipe Trades Health & Welfare Fund v. Medtronic, Inc., 845 F.3d 384, 
391–93 (8th Cir. 2016). Finally, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Inter-
state Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), which removed the availabil-
ity of a private right of action for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, has been interpreted as precluding private lawsuits 
based on claims of participation in a conspiracy by otherwise secondary viola-
tors: “[E]very court to have addressed the viability of a conspiracy cause of 
action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the wake of Central Bank has agreed 
that Central Bank precludes such a cause of action.” Dinsmore v. Squadron, 
Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1998). 
73 For the author’s discussion of insider trading in the context of the order 
type controversy, see Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and 
the Evolution of the Securities Market Structure, supra note 72, at 155–56 & 
n.56. This issue is separate from the much broader debate of whether certain 
speed-based advantages or access to specialized data products constitute or 
should be treated like insider trading. While such practices generally still pass 
the muster of legality, perhaps some specific instances could be characterized 
as insider trading. For an illustration, see Mercer Bullard, Insider Trading in 
a Mannean Marketplace, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 223 (2016). 
74 For an earlier version of this taxonomy, which addresses only SROs, see 
Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the Evolution of the 
Securities Market Structure, supra note 72, at 154. 
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their order types in a variety of forms.75 Furthermore, one impor-
tant consideration is that trading venues often duplicate or im-
plement—sometimes by directly regulating their own market 
participants—regulatory norms under federal securities law. As an 
illustration, the trade-through rule contained in Regulation NMS 
has been imposed on “trading centers” and not necessarily on indi-
vidual traders.76 In other words, one may contrast a market partic-
ipant committing an actual violation of an SEC rule and a market 
participant taking advantage of some trading venue-provided 
functionality that is contrary to an SEC rule, with the second 
                                                                                                            
75 See, e.g., BATS Exch., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter 3 n.7 (Feb. 25, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2010/batsexchange0225 
10-10b10.pdf [https://perma.cc/94RB-UHQB] (noting the representation made 
by BATS that its “rules do not provide for any special order type that would 
be an exception to the strict price-time priority handling of orders as set forth 
in Rule 21.8(a) of the Exchange”). 
76 See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 
37,496, 37,631 (June 9, 2005) (codified at Order Protection Rule, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 242.611(a)(1)), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-06-29/pdf/05-11802 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4DL-MA5X] (“A trading center [a category that in-
cludes on-exchange and off-exchange market makers along with securities 
exchanges and ATSs] shall establish, maintain, and enforce written policies 
and procedures that are reasonably designed to prevent trade-throughs on 
that trading center of protected quotations in NMS stocks [subject to several 
enumerated exceptions].”). One relevant administrative adjudication, which 
dealt with regulation of specialists by securities exchanges, stated that Sec-
tion 11(b) of the Exchange Act and the corresponding SEC rule “do[ ] not place any 
requirements directly on specialists [as opposed to securities exchanges], and 
thus cannot be violated by specialists.” David A. Finnerty, Initial Decision 
Release No. 381, 96 SEC Docket 1098, 1034–35 (ALJ July 13, 2009). Another 
interesting scenario is presented by the SEC’s enforcement action against UBS, 
with one of the allegations involving the existence of the subpenny functional-
ity used by HFTs and other preferred market participants, which was contrary 
to Regulation NMS. UBS Sec. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9697, Exchange 
Act Release No. 74,060 passim (Jan. 15, 2015) (settled proceeding), http:// 
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/33-9697.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EA8-HQTG]. 
The applicable rule’s language, which unambiguously covers the conduct of 
UBS’s dark pool itself, is as follows: “No national securities exchange, national 
securities association, alternative trading system, vendor, or broker or dealer 
shall display, rank, or accept from any person a bid or offer, an order, or an 
indication of interest in any NMS stock priced in an increment smaller than 
$0.01.” Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,632 (codified at Minimum Pricing 
Increment, 17 C.F.R. § 242.612(a)) (emphasis added). However, another ques-
tion is whether this language would expose an HFT, assuming its broker-
dealer status, for placing a de facto subpenny order. 
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scenario probably being more common. Finally, it is important to 
remember that a violation of a regulatory norm under federal secu-
rities law or a rule of an individual trading venue does not automat-
ically qualify as securities fraud.77 As a constant reminder, “Section 
10(b) [of the Exchange Act] is aptly described as a catchall pro-
vision, but what it catches must be fraud.”78 
Probably the most promising approach to attaching liability 
to market participants, such as HFTs, lies in breaking rules of 
trading venues by employing certain functionalities because their 
features are in fact contrary to their publicly disclosed documen-
tation, such as SRO rules. Conceptually—and guided by a sizable 
body of case law and supporting analysis—it is possible to base a 
securities fraud claim on violations of SRO rules, as opposed to 
treating such violations as independent causes of action under 
federal securities law.79 While SRO rules approved by the SEC 
                                                                                                            
77 See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World: 
Trading Obligations and Privileges of Market Makers and a Private Right of 
Action, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 303, 331 (2013) [hereinafter Dolgopolov, 
Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World] (“Overall, not every violation 
of an SRO rule constitutes fraud under federal securities law—or even a 
direct economic injury that does not necessarily come under the umbrella of 
fraud—but some of such violations do rise to that level.”). 
78 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980). 
79 For the author’s analysis of this approach, including the issue of implied 
representations about compliance with the applicable trading protocol, see 
Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the Evolution of the 
Securities Market Structure, supra note 72, at 154–61; Dolgopolov, Providing 
Liquidity in a High-Frequency World, supra note 77, passim; see also Milliner 
v. Mut. Sec., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“[C]ourts have 
often looked to [SRO] rules in defining the scope of common law duties.”); In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., MDL 1446, Civil Action No. 
H-01-3624, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101230, at *229 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2016) 
(“While not providing a private right of legal action, violations of the NASD or 
the NYSE rules are relevant to demonstrating a course of conduct or deceptive act 
constituting fraud under § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] and Rule 10b-5.”). 
Among the recent cases, the concept of implied representations was raised in 
VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2011), which triggered the deference 
standard under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Another recent case questioned the validity of this prece-
dent: “[I]t is not at all clear that the Second Circuit definitively has taken the 
position that Commission interpretations in adjudicatory proceedings are 
entitled to Chevron deference. That is especially so in view of the fact that the 
‘formal adjudicatory decision’ referred to in VanCook was not the product of 
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are not the only source of trading rules, this category is an im-
portant illustration. Ultimately, the relevant distinction is between 
universally available trading rules—be they an exchange’s publicly 
disclosed rulebook with the regulators’ stamp of approval or an 
ATS’s technical manual distributed to all subscribers—and se-
lectively disclosed trading rules. 
To condense, a viable approach to attaching primary liability 
to HFTs as market participants in connection with securities 
fraud is likely to lay in violations of the applicable trading proto-
col, chiefly meaning rules of individual trading venues, in con-
nection with selective disclosure. Yet, it becomes essential to 
define the nature of the underlying violation, especially because 
such market participants typically need not take discretionary 
affirmative action to break the rule in question.80 It is not about 
                                                                                                            
an adversary litigation, but a consent order entered to settle an administra-
tive case.” Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). However, as 
previously pointed out by the author, the application of the Chevron deference 
to settlements may be problematic, but a different level of deference could apply. 
Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the Evolution of the 
Securities Market Structure, supra note 72, at 158–60 & nn.73–78. 
80 For an illustration of the scenario of discretionary affirmative action of-
fered by several controversies involving exchange specialists that combined 
the roles of order matching agents and market participants through their 
principal trading activities, see In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 281, 291–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Press Release No. 2009-42, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges 14 Specialist Firms for Improper Proprietary 
Trading (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-42.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4S6B-ADB4]. By contrast, the modern paradigm is essen-
tially based on rules that are programmed into electronic order matching 
engines. In other words, in a typical scenario, there is no specific opportunity, 
as a trade-by-trade deliberate action, to break the boundaries of the applica-
ble rules, as written, or to comply with them. But the opposite scenario of 
discretionary violations by some market participants is also possible. For 
instance, the SEC has scrutinized whether certain order types are being used 
properly: “If Latour is using a set of ISOs [intermarket sweep orders] to dis-
play a post-only order, it must comply with the rules adopted by exchanges 
under Rule 610 of Reg NMS and send ISOs to remove any equal- or better-
priced protected quotations.” Latour Trading LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 
76,029, at 6 (Sept. 30, 2015) (settled proceeding), http://www.sec.gov/litigation 
/admin/2015/34-76029.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D9G-382C]. The SEC also observed 
that “Latour received $2,784,875 in gross trading profits and exchange rebates 
from its non-compliant ISOs” and concluded that “Latour violated Rule 611(c) 
[of Regulation NMS] because it failed to take reasonable steps to establish 
that its ISOs met the requirements set forth in Rule 600(b)(30).” Id. at 13, 15. 
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merely using a certain functionality after having received detailed 
selective disclosure about its features, let alone an imprecise tip 
or a possibly distorted industry rumor. The crux is in an intention 
to use specific and certain discrepancies between documented and 
actual features, which, once again, needs to be compared to a less 
questionable hypothetical of merely undocumented, but not con-
tradictory, features. If the very purpose of using a certain func-
tionality is to circumvent—and operate contrary to—the existing 
formal documentation in order to obtain a trading advantage, 
that logically suggests the existence of securities fraud. Actual 
knowledge as a prerequisite for intent is all but guaranteed to be 
present. After all, a firm requesting or designing a certain func-
tionality would surely scrutinize the applicable formal documen-
tation once this functionality is adopted by the trading venue in 
question, and, more generally, a market participant is likely to be 
aware of any discrepancy simply on the basis of selective disclosure. 
Moreover, such practices may be invisible and thus repetitive, 
resulting in stealth transfers of wealth likely to be diffused among 
numerous market participants, which could even be hardly 
traced and reconstructed in market data and thus be virtually un-
detectable to an outside observer. This stealthiness is a critical 
feature of many HFT practices in question, which also points in 
the direction of their fraudulent nature.81 Once again, the difference 
between SRO and non-SRO trading venues should not matter with 
respect to liability of market participants utilizing discrepancies 
between the official documentation and the actual functionality. 
A helpful analogy is offered by the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine, which serves as a means for plaintiffs to prove their 
losses from affirmative misrepresentations and, in some instances, 
omissions without demonstrating specific reliance but instead 
presuming “the integrity of the market price.”82 A comparison 
proposed by the author is the concept of the integrity of the trading 
process, defined as the compliance with the applicable trading 
protocol by all market participants combined with the accuracy and 
transparency of that protocol, which would preclude systematic 
                                                                                                            
81 See also Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World, supra 
note 77, at 340–41 (stating that “[t]he reach of the federal antifraud prohibi-
tion is especially relevant when such violations remain undetected” and pointing 
out that “[a] transaction’s alternative terms may not be transparent”). 
82 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
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informational advantages exploited by any group.83 Arguably, it 
may be said that the marketplace as a whole relies on the integ-
rity of the trading process, as a prerequisite for a proper interac-
tion of orders. This concept has relevance for the existence of 
investor harm just as the integrity of the market price, a concept 
divorced from the realities of the applicable trading protocol. 
Both of these approaches address the mechanism of price for-
mation—either from a macro or a micro perspective—in the con-
text of informational asymmetries, but neither one requires an 
idealized informational parity with respect to securities them-
selves. Likewise, both of these approaches could fit into Basic’s 
rhetorical question about “roll[ing] the dice in a crooked crap 
game.”84 Moreover, the link between the wrongdoers’ trading 
gains and other market participants’ losses is much stronger in 
the case of the concept of the integrity of the market process 
compared to its counterpart.85 
Interestingly, one court’s observation from a not-so-distant 
and yet very technologically simple era offers the following for-
ward-looking observation made in the context of the fraud-
on-the-market doctrine: 
                                                                                                            
83 For the author’s earlier discussion of the concept of the integrity of the 
trading process in the context of trading obligations and privileges of market 
makers established by SRO rules, see Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a 
High-Frequency World, supra note 77, at 342. In fact, the issue of such trading 
obligations and privileges remains a concern. For instance, Virtu Financial 
was recently censured for “failing to maintain continuous, two-sided trading 
interest in approximately 57,045 instances” on NYSE Arca, while being re-
minded that, “[b]ecause Market Makers receive benefits for their registration 
in particular symbols, it is essential that they uphold the quoting obligations 
associated with their registered symbols, and provide market [liquidity] in 
the form of continuous quoting.” NYSE Regulation v. Virtu Fin. BD LLC, 
Proceeding No. 2016-07-01267, at 2 (Office of Hearing Officers, Fin. Auth. 
Regulatory Auth., Inc. Dec. 20, 2016) (settled proceeding), https://www.nyse 
.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse-arca/disciplinary-actions/2016/Virtu%20 
Financial%20-%20AHP%20Arca%20Decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FLL-8BN9]. 
84 Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 
F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
85 For a summary of concerns about the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, 
such as a weak link between wrongdoers’ trading gains and other market 
participants’ losses, the absence of the requirement that wrongdoers must 
engage in trading activities themselves, and windfall gains of innocent par-
ties, see A.C. Pritchard, Halliburton II: A Loser’s History, 10 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 34–39 (2015). 
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Just as information about a specific security is reflected in the 
price of that security, so too is information about the manner 
in which transactions would be completed reflected in the price 
of securities generally. Plaintiffs may be presumed to have re-
lied upon information indicating that securities would be matched 
by specialists, as opposed to bought and sold at artificially high 
and low prices.86 
While there could be some debate about the correctness of using 
the word “artificial,” at least in the sense of a lasting price effect, 
this statement provides a valuable perspective on modern itera-
tions of such practices, including mechanics of the order match-
ing process, such as the phenomenon of queue jumping, and 
shows the relevance of discrepancies between disclosed and ac-
tual features in the zero-sum game of short-term trading. 
Importantly, the phenomenon of secret arrangements is 
not confined to the order type controversy. Other layers of rules 
of individual trading venues, albeit sometimes less precise ones, 
may be affected. One illustration is a settlement between the 
SEC and Credit Suisse focused on Light Pool, the latter’s ECN, 
as it was “represented to clients and existing and prospective 
subscribers that all Light Pool participants, including HFTs, 
would be classified pursuant to an objective formula and those 
‘participants,’ ‘traders,’ or ‘clients’ who were classified as oppor-
tunistic would ‘lose access to’ or be ‘kicked out.’”87 In reality, the 
relevant Alpha Formula was “applied ... separately to the order 
flow submitted under each system ID of a subscriber,” thus al-
lowing such a subscriber to retain direct access.88 Furthermore, 
“[s]ubscribers could request different connections to Light Pool, 
for example, to designate different trading strategies that they 
may employ for trading in Light Pool.”89 Similarly, Credit Suisse 
gave direct subscribers—including some HFTs—the opportunity 
to improve their trading to avoid being labeled ‘opportunistic.’ 
[Credit Suisse] made mid-monthly calls to direct subscribers 
                                                                                                            
86 In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 2d 281, 318–19 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
87 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10,014, Ex-
change Act Release No. 77,003, at 6 (Jan. 31, 2016) (settled proceeding), https:// 
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AXC-QB2A]. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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whose flow was in danger of being characterized as opportunis-
tic. This practice allowed direct subscribers to improve their 
flow to avoid an opportunistic score at month-end.90 
Overall, this settlement paints a picture of inaccurate represen-
tations of certain functionalities and selective disclosure practices. 
Moreover, several similar settlements address the issue of inaccu-
rate and inconsistent classification of opportunistic/aggressive/toxic 
trading in other ATSs, although the apparent existence of sym-
biotic relationships between trading venues and preferred mar-
ket participants was not backed up by any specific evidence of 
selective disclosure practices.91 Once again, given a varying speci-
ficity, if not vagueness, of applicable representations, the path to 
attaching liability is likely to depend on the existence of clear 
discrepancies with the disclosed trading protocol and the intent 
of preferred market participants to use such discrepancies. 
III. GLITCHES AND GAMING 
Another type of questionable practice comes under the 
umbrella of “gaming,” which is often understood as the exploita-
tion of “glitches” in the applicable trading protocol on the level of 
individual trading venues. The term “gaming”—or, in some in-
stances, more accurately described as “reverse engineering”—
does not need to overlap with secret handshakes, as a trading 
venue’s deliberate involvement is typically nonexistent. In this 
scenario, there is no collusion between a trading venue and pre-
ferred market participants, and such discrepancies may arise 
merely because of that trading venue’s negligence or, in some 
instances, even randomness, with such bugs being discovered 
fortuitously, searched for systematically, or, quite importantly, 
revealed by inside sources. Furthermore, it is natural to expect 
unintended consequences created by the very indeterminacy of 
                                                                                                            
90 Id. 
91 For several examples, see Barclays Capital Inc., Securities Act Release 
No. 10,010, Exchange Act Release No. 77,001 passim (Jan. 31, 2016) (settled 
proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10010.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZY4U-NW6B]; Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, Securities Act Release 
No. 10,013, Exchange Act Release No. 77,002 passim (Jan. 31, 2016) (settled 
proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10013.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/JA4G-NX8E]. 
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complex rules frequently combined with inadequacy of disclo-
sure. As observed in the context of the order matching process, 
“The highly intertwined matching logic of a venue makes it diffi-
cult to ensure that one component of a trading system does not 
‘overrule’ another component resulting in unintended behaviours 
of the system.”92 Furthermore, some discovered “glitches” could 
actually be a result of a trading venue’s selective disclosure of 
hidden features to other market participants rather than unin-
tended consequences. 
To the extent that “gaming” captures the exploitation of 
unintended consequences or the very nature of complexity, in-
cluding the phenomenon of conflicting rules disclosed in the 
same fashion, it is very problematic to outlaw this conduct ex ante. 
A mere opportunistic exploration, which could be described as 
“testing the limits” or, in some instances, “regulatory arbitrage,” 
is inevitable. The issue of loopholes, generally speaking, is not a 
new one. As described by one court in an area far removed from 
securities regulation, “Taking advantage of loopholes in laws is a 
time-honored American tradition. It is not a deceitful or unfair 
means to an end.”93 Likewise, merely taking advantage of loop-
holes in rules of trading venues suggests the same outcome. Ac-
cordingly, the use of certain undocumented features in the absence 
of any discrepancies with formal documentation would be a very 
difficult case for liability. 
On the other hand, there is one scenario suggesting the 
exposure to liability in connection with securities fraud. More 
specifically, some industry rumors point to HFTs “figuring out” 
order matching engines’ inner workings in order to exploit un-
documented features that are contrary to the applicable rule-
book, technical specifications, and other disclosures. While there 
could be some form of liability for unauthorized access, no true 
“hacking” is required for such practices. Indeed, there is some 
awareness within the industry that “buggy” or “buggier” trading 
venues may serve as a source of trading profits. Likewise, there 
have been rumors of former exchange employees leaving for 
HFT firms and bringing the applicable order matching engine’s 
                                                                                                            
92 IGNATOVICH & PASSMORE, supra note 18, at 11. 
93 Buffalo S. R.R. Inc. v. Vill. of Croton-on-Hudson, 434 F. Supp. 2d 241, 
254 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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source code with them in order to identify any exploitable glitches. 
Once again, the very feasibility of turning any discrepancies to 
one’s own advantage in the trading process could be a powerful 
competitive tool. Moreover, the scenario of glitches somewhat re-
sembles the order type controversy in the sense that specific 
order types or their modifiers are likely be involved. Likewise, 
this type of conduct may be associated with inadequate disclo-
sure practices of trading venues. 
Thus, overall, the nature of the underlying violations lies 
in an intention to use discrepancies between documented and 
actual features, which could trigger liability for securities fraud. 
In other words, from the standpoint of liability, the difference 
between an HFT taking advantage of selective disclosure and an 
HFT independently aware of the discrepancy in question may 
not be meaningful under certain circumstances. Once again, the 
concept of the integrity of the trading process is a useful analogy. 
There would be serious disruptive implications if the multitude 
of market participants is expected not to rely on the integrity of 
the applicable trading protocol, as properly disclosed rules of the 
game, and identify glitches capturing discrepancies between 
documented and actual features on a self-help basis. Even if any 
such discrepancy could have been discovered by other market 
participants, that does not make this piece of information acces-
sible to the general public, given the uncertainty of another dis-
covery and potential costs associated with a deliberate search. 
While using security- or issuer-specific information under oth-
erwise similar circumstances would have been legitimate, taking 
advantage of discrepancies with the general rules governing the 
trading process itself is much more problematic. 
IV.  IDENTIFYING (OR REDEFINING) MARKET MANIPULATION 
The doctrine of market manipulation is not necessarily 
easy to apply to new practices, although some modern iterations 
of manipulative trading fit the traditional pattern. For instance, 
the much-discussed practices of “spoofing” and “layering” have 
been classified as manipulative in legal actions with at least 
some connection to HFT, but such instances seem to be confined 
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to the futures and commodities space.94 In securities markets, it 
remains to be seen whether larger players in the HFT space 
have been involved in manipulative schemes, such as spoofing 
and layering, and how common such practices are.95 Yet, overall, 
a more pressing question is whether a host of HFT practices 
could even be properly classified as market manipulation. Some 
practices, such as those solely based on transparent speed-related 
advantages, are problematic to fit into the definition of market 
manipulation, and one also needs to be mindful of distinctions 
between market manipulation, price discovery, and liquidity 
provision.96 However, a pivotal appellate decision recognized the 
                                                                                                            
94 See, e.g., United States v. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1090–93 (N.D. 
Ill. 2016) (denying the motion for judgment of acquittal and a new trial of a 
defendant who “implemented a high-frequency trading program that essen-
tially enabled him to manipulate the commodities markets” with respect to 
the charges of fraud and spoofing under the Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936). For additional examples of market manipulation, as well as “spoofing” 
as a separately defined violation in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, from the 
futures and commodities space, which implicated both lone traders and estab-
lished firms and involved tools of varying technological sophistication, see 
CFTC v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Ill. 2016); CFTC v. Wilson, 27 
F. Supp. 3d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., CFTC No. 17-06 
(Jan. 19, 2017) (settled proceeding), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lren 
forcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcitigroupglobalorder011917.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FUK9-LL7D]; Consent Order of Permanent Injunction, Civil 
Monetary Penalty, and Other Equitable Relief Against Navinder Singh 
Sarao, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd., No. 1:15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 
2016). For the above-mentioned prohibition of spoofing, see Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 747, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)), https://www.gpo.gov 
/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4 
5Y-6DL4]. For an extensive discussion of market manipulation and disruptive 
trading practices relating to HFT and automated trading more generally in the 
futures and commodities space, see Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading 
Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of Futures Contracts?: Policing 
Markets for Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 67 FLA. L. 
REV. 221 (2015). 
95 Interestingly, an earlier iteration of spoofing in securities markets, also 
known as “auto-execution manipulation,” abused the automated execution fea-
ture offered by market makers, and it could be done through manual means. 
Terrance Yoshikawa, Exchange Act Release No. 53,731, 87 SEC Docket 2580, 
2586 & n.36 (Apr. 26, 2006). 
96 For instance, one HFT practice difficult to characterize as truly manipu-
lative is “exploratory trading,” which has been described as “a form of costly 
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fitness of the allegations that “sufficiently plead that the ex-
changes misled investors by providing products and services 
[i.e., colocation services, private data feeds, and complex order 
types] that artificially affected market activity,” while pointing 
out that these allegations included claims about inadequate dis-
closure for such products and services.97 
Accordingly, it becomes critical to identify the scope of 
market manipulation as such. As summarized by a leading 
commentator, “The essence of the fraud in a Section 10(b) ma-
nipulation case is the creation of an artificial price.”98 Logically 
interpreted, the term “artificial price” means, with some inevita-
ble vagueness, pushing the market price in the “wrong” direction 
or delaying a move in the “correct” direction. Not being satisfied 
by this restriction, one court engaged in doctrinal struggles in its 
dictum pronouncement in order to bring additional practices 
under the umbrella of market manipulation: “There is nothing in 
the text of Section 10(b) that limits manipulation (a concept which, 
thanks to the boundless creativity of capitalism, can include 
                                                                                                            
information acquisition [which] does not generate information that relates 
directly to the traded asset’s fundamental value, but that pertains rather to 
unobservable aspects of market conditions that could eventually become 
public, ex-post, through ordinary market interactions.” Adam D. Clark-Joseph, 
Exploratory Trading 48–49 (Dec. 31, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author), https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2015conference/program/retrieve 
.php?pdfid=1133 [https://perma.cc/78QN-BS46]. 
97 City of Providence v. BATS Global Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 49 (2d Cir. 
2017). Although not discussed by the court, one analogy from the era predating 
the rise of exchange-administered order matching engines is offered by In re 
NYSE Specialists Securities Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
which recognized a sufficient legal claim for market manipulation with respect to 
the practices essentially amounting to order matching abuses by exchange 
specialists that combined the roles of order matching agents and market 
participants through their principal trading activities. Id. at 292, 311–16. 
98 JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
MARKET MANIPULATION 392 (2014). This commentator emphasized the impor-
tance of distinguishing the intended, actual, and potential artificial price impact 
from a doctrinal standpoint, while criticizing the seeming overreach of regu-
latory agencies “to attack any market practice they deem undesirable.” Id. at 
391–93. The following analogy is also worth mentioning: “Economically, it 
can be said that every order affects the market, but that is like saying that 
the air stirred by a butterfly’s wings in Africa gave rise to a wind that became 
a hurricane that devastated America’s coast.” Id. at 392. 
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many kinds of conduct) to price manipulation.”99 However, in ad-
dition to the appellate decision in the same lawsuit, the weight 
of the existing case law, without any significant deviations, 
points to the necessity of an artificial impact on a security’s 
price,100 and taking this factor out of the equation would dissolve 
the existing concept of market manipulation. The courts have 
also recognized that a mere price impact is not by itself evidence 
of market manipulation,101 given that virtually every transaction 
                                                                                                            
99 Rabin v. NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC, 182 F. Supp. 3d 220, 244 (E.D. Pa. 
2016). 
100 The appellate decision maintained that “[t]o state a claim for manipu-
lation under [Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5], a plaintiff 
must show [conduct] for the purpose of artificially depressing or inflating the 
price of the security.” Rabin v. NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC, No. 16-2511, 2017 
U.S. App. LEXIS 21093, at *8 (3d Cir. Oct. 25, 2017); see also Santa Fe In-
dus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (stating that manipulative prac-
tices under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 “artificially 
affect[ ] market activity in order to mislead investors” and putting this defini-
tion within “the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipu-
late securities prices”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) 
(stating that, in the context of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 
10b-5, “the word ‘manipulative’ ... connotes intentional or willful conduct 
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting 
the price of securities”); Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 716 F.3d 18, 25 
(2d Cir. 2013) (characterizing market manipulation covered by Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 as “when an artificial or phony price of a 
security is communicated to persons who, in reliance upon a misrepresenta-
tion that the price was set by market forces, purchase the securities”); In re 
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 668, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(stating that “[a] market manipulation is a discrete act that influences stock 
price [relative to] its true value”). 
101 See, e.g., GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 205 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (endorsing “a construction [that] permits courts to differentiate 
between legitimate trading activities that permissibly may influence prices, 
such as short sales, and ‘ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate 
securities prices’” (quoting Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477)); United States v. Mul-
heren, 938 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying, in the context of Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, the prosecution’s theory that, 
“[w]hen the transaction is effected for an investment purpose ... there is no 
manipulation, even if an increase or diminution in price was a foreseeable 
consequence of the investment”); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that “[t]he [federal] securities 
laws do not proscribe all buying or selling which tends to raise or lower the 
price of a security” and that, “[s]o long as the investor’s motive in buying or 
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has some potential marginal impact on the price formation pro-
cess. A related point is that artificial price changes need to be 
matched to primary violators, as illustrated by a key appellate 
assertion that being a primary violator does not require direct 
participation “in any manipulative ‘trading activity’” and that “the 
plaintiffs [did] not assert that the exchanges [by virtue of provid-
ing products and services to traders] simply facilitated manipu-
lative conduct by the HFT firms.”102 
However, stretching the doctrine of market manipulation 
is not even necessary, even if the underlying practices look ma-
nipulation-like in terms of boosting trading volume, which might 
suggest an element of false appearances/deception. Recognizing 
that a security’s price is not the only dimension of loss, the regu-
lators have been on the path of finding fraudulent conduct even 
in the absence of any price impact when certain rules of trading 
venues are flaunted or abused—not just directly broken—in order 
to secure/reallocate an economic benefit that otherwise would not 
have accrued and likely at the expense of others. Of course, 
drawing a line between mere “gaming” and “abuse,” short of un-
ambiguous direct violations, is a concern, but the ultimate goals 
of the rule in question may provide some guidance in a case-by-case 
analysis. For instance, the SEC characterized as securities fraud 
offsetting transactions designed to obtain market data revenues 
paid out by the Consolidated Tape Association (“CTA”) and 
shared by NASDAQ with member firms, maintaining that “[such] 
trades through MarketXT [the affiliated ECN] caused Nasdaq to 
receive more than its proper share of market data revenue, 
thereby defrauding other CTA participants.”103 Likewise, the SEC 
                                                                                                            
selling a security is not to create an artificial demand for, or supply of, the 
security, illegal market manipulation is not established”). 
102 City of Providence, 878 F.3d at 49–52. By contrast, the reversed deci-
sion by the district court stated that the scrutinized actions by the exchanges 
“merely enabled an HFT firm to execute a transaction, and it was the trans-
action itself that caused the allegedly artificial effect on the market [rather 
than] the Exchanges’ provision of co-location services, proprietary data feeds, 
and complex order types to the HFT firms.” In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & 
High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 342, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
103 Irfan Mohammed Amanat, Exchange Act Release No. 54,708, 89 SEC 
Docket 672, 678 (Nov. 3, 2006), aff’d, 269 F. App’x 217 (3d Cir. 2008). Moreover, 
the SEC emphasized that it had not been alleged that such “wash trading 
affected the price of the [exchange-traded funds],” as opposed to the allegation 
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applied the same characterization to mismarking “professional” 
and “customer” designations that resulted in distorted determi-
nation by securities exchanges of “which orders received priority 
of execution and the amounts of all related transaction credits 
and debits, including liquidity rebates, ‘take’ fees, transaction 
costs, and cancellation fees,” deprived these securities exchanges 
of certain fees, and “unfairly disadvantaged other professional 
market participants over whom the Respondents’ ‘customer’ orders 
wrongly received priority of execution for orders at the same 
price.”104 Importantly, these examples do not even involve infor-
mational asymmetries pertaining to specific functionalities, and the 
existence of such asymmetries would have further strengthened 
the case for characterizing underlying practices as securities fraud. 
Finally, going back to the practices relevant to the current 
market structure crisis, including the order type controversy, the 
reach of market manipulation as such is not essential: “[T]he scope 
of securities fraud is much wider than market manipulation. 
Consider that riding price changes with the assistance of inade-
quately documented functionalities is different from creating 
                                                                                                            
that “Amanat used wash and matched trades to defraud Nasdaq and other 
CTA participants.” Id. at 678 n.33. Amanat should be compared to—and 
distinguished from—Rockies Fund, Inc. v. SEC, 428 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 
2005), in which the court concluded that “neither of [the practices of matched 
orders and wash sales] alone constitutes a securities violation,” including the 
reach of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, id. at 1093, de-
spite their inherent trading volume-boosting nature. The court did not estab-
lish the existence of any “manipulative price setting” or any other artificial 
price impact, id. at 1094–95, while pointing out that at least some of the 
scrutinized transactions might have been motivated by liquidity needs, id. at 
1095. In other words, the very purpose of trading volume-boosting strategies 
appears to be important, for instance, whether they take place at the expense 
of other market participants. Turning back to Amanat, the trading strategy 
in question ran contrary to the practice followed by “CTA participants [that] 
wash trades and matched orders [are] illegitimate and non-qualifying for 
purposes of allocating market data revenues” and thus require reallocation, 
and, in fact, NASDAQ had made a corresponding reimbursement. Amanat, 89 
SEC Docket at 677 n.24, 678 n.29. 
104 Behruz Afshar, Securities Act Release No. 10,094, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 78,043, Investment Company Act Release No. 32,144, at 11–12, 17 
(June 13, 2016) (settled proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin 
/2016/33-10094.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH8B-RNEB]. It should be noted that a 
separate charge in the same proceeding alleged “manipulative trading known 
as ‘spoofing’ to collect rebates from the PHLX.” Id. at 3. 
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artificial price patterns in order to profit from them, which is the 
essence of market manipulation.”105 In fact, no radical—and 
potentially problematic—doctrinal restructuring would be required, 
and, even as a mere prediction, any shift to non-price-based market 
manipulation is unlikely to materialize in the foreseeable future. 
At the same time, novel methods of market manipulation, which 
may or may not be based on market structure-embedded infor-
mational asymmetries, still need to be monitored for. In fact, 
having a market structure perspective on short-term/small-scale 
price variations, which may appear different from more tradi-
tional examples of market manipulation, is indeed warranted for 
gatekeepers, and novel applications and iterations of the doc-
trine of market manipulation may provide additional legal tools 
for any litigant. 
CONCLUSION 
While the HFT segment of the securities industry has not 
yet been truly shaken by massive litigation, targeting certain 
questionable practices as securities fraud might be both desir-
able and viable, with private lawsuits playing an important role. 
In fact, a gamut of informational asymmetries, both deliberate or 
accidental, has been deeply rooted in the evolving market struc-
ture and resulted in substantial stealth wealth transfers. The ability 
to pick up “bread crumbs” through means like queue jumping has 
a clear economic value obtained at the expense of other market 
participants, even in instances when there is no truly artificial im-
pact on the market price as such. Some players in the HFT seg-
ment are not just accidental beneficiaries and skillful navigators of 
disruptive changes and complexity defining the current market 
structure crisis. Certain HFT practices are in fact drivers of this 
crisis, often greased by secret arrangements with trading venues, 
and some bad actors may be characterized as primary violators 
guilty of securities fraud. Arguably, the scope of primary violations 
is not as restrictive as it may seem. The proposed approach is not 
necessarily grounded in the existence of a conspiracy between a 
trading venue and preferred market participants. Instead, this 
approach is based on specific trading activities intentionally 
taking advantage of certain functionalities that act differently 
                                                                                                            
105 BODEK & DOLGOPOLOV, supra note 1, at 125. 
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than—and thus contrary to—their official documentation, with 
such discrepancies constituting the very “edge.” 
Doctrinal challenges to attaching liability to HFTs are too 
palpable to be ignored. However, the proposed approach to cover 
as securities fraud—although not in a mechanic way—violations 
and abuses of the applicable trading protocol, including rules of 
individual trading venues, would not be unprecedented. This 
approach to liability, if carefully crafted and balanced, would not 
open the proverbial floodgates of private lawsuits alleging secu-
rities fraud or mandate a radical doctrinal restructuring of market 
manipulation. The very requirement of discrepancies between 
documented and actual features, as opposed to gray areas, would 
help isolate fraudulent conduct. Likewise, the line between 
breaking—or truly abusing—the rules governing the applicable 
trading protocol and just taking advantage of them would be 
preserved. Furthermore, a mere usage of a given functionality 
would not be sufficient to constitute securities fraud: quite likely, 
the limiting factor would be one’s intent to use the discrepancy 
in question. As always, taking into account the ever-present ten-
sion between flexible and restrictive interpretations of the scope 
of securities fraud and the reach of relevant legal tools, some 
judicial restraint would serve the end goal of catching fraudu-
lent conduct as such. 
An important question is why HFTs have not become an 
important target in litigation centered on securities fraud. A 
potential answer lies in difficulties with demonstrating the state 
of mind, intent, tit-for-tat/conspiracy-like arrangements with 
trading venues, and knowledge of the inadequacy of formal dis-
closure, including specific communications that amount to a 
smoking gun. Furthermore, many practices in question are solely 
conduct-based and do not involve specific public statements. 
Overall, showing the intent of using the functionality in question to 
utilize discrepancies between documented and actual features is 
a high bar, although uncovering an abusive algorithm could serve 
as solid evidence. Of course, a threat of private litigation is not 
the only deterrent—and not necessarily the most effective one, 
and this factor stresses the significance of market reform. Also, 
not all problematic trading practices could pass the hurdle of 
being characterized as fraudulent, as illustrated by the SEC’s 
focus on creating regulatory restraints on disruptive trading 
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rather than using the existing legal tools.106 Similarly, as a 
bird’s eye view of the SEC’s recent enforcement program, the 
regulators have often preferred identifying technical violations, 
as opposed to asserting the existence of deliberate wrongdoing in 
the form of securities fraud, and employed a cautionary ap-
proach of targeting trading venues alone instead of specific mar-
ket participants. 
Finally, the proposed approach to liability and the current 
market structure crisis itself may be viewed through the lens of 
the concept of the integrity of the trading process. Given the 
zero-sum nature of short-term trading, the integrity of the trad-
ing process is neither an overreaching concept devoid of meaning 
nor a merely aspirational ideal. If needed, informational asymme-
tries that amount to rent-seeking for selected groups of market 
participants need to be addressed though liability for securities 
fraud. Looking beyond the crisis of today, this framework would 
not lose its relevance, especially given that the modern electronic 
marketplace’s complexity is expected to last into the foreseeable 
future and the persistent lure of secret arrangements and ex-
ploitable glitches. 
                                                                                                            
106 See Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Enhancing 
Our Equity Market Structure: Remarks at Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P. 
Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference (June 5, 2014), http://www.sec 
.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312#.U99FBGN5WEc [https:// 
perma.cc/NU39-HVGZ] (stating that the contemplated anti-disruptive rule 
“will need to be carefully tailored to apply to active proprietary traders in 
short time periods when liquidity is most vulnerable and the risk of price 
disruption caused by aggressive short-term trading strategies is highest”); see 
also Regulatory Reforms to Improve Equity Market Structure: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban 
Affairs, 114th Cong. 33 (2016) (prepared statement of Stephen Luparello, 
Director of the Division of Trading and Markets, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114shrg99832 
/pdf/CHRG-114shrg99832.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6HS-FRUD] (stating that “SEC 
staff is developing a recommendation for the Commission” for the contem-
plated anti-disruptive rule). 
